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Introduction: 
That we have duties to protect those most vulnerable to our actions, choices, 
and policies is difficult to deny. The concept of vulnerability has thus come to play a 
central role in various debates in applied ethics and political philosophy, and has 
been relied upon to articulate the ethical duties owed to patients, research subjects, 
children, the elderly, women, future generations, and the global precariat. It has also, 
and importantly for our purposes here, been engaged to ground the collective duties 
of justice owed to recipients of liberal welfare and social insurance programs. 
Philosophers who appeal to the concept of vulnerability see it as a valuable tool, not 
only with which to identify a class of individuals who are particularly susceptible to 
the harmful actions and choices of specific others or specific social institutions, but 
also to ground the normative duties they are owed.  
For political philosophers who engage the concept, normatively salient 
vulnerabilities derive not merely from the fact of our embodiment, but as a result of 
the actions and choices of others and the social institutions they erect and maintain. 
We are thereby called upon not just to respond humanely to suffering as such, but to 
stop using our relational authority to take advantage of vulnerable others, and to 
build and maintain the kinds of social structures that do not arbitrarily deprive, 
discriminate, or exploit the vulnerable. The question we are interested in here is 
whether vulnerability as a concept can in fact carry the kind of normative burden it 
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has been given by proponents who employ it as a ground for duties of justice and 
thus for the central institutions of the welfare state.  
We begin in part one of the paper by asking how vulnerability theorists have 
justified the claim that we share institutional duties to alleviate vulnerability. The 
answer we propose is that they have almost universally done so by appealing to the 
concept of basic needs. That is, in identifying the foundations of our collective 
obligations to the vulnerable, the harm to which they are susceptible due to a 
deprivation in their basic needs proves central. Diverse vulnerability theorists 
appeal respectively to accounts of exploitation, autonomy, or flourishing to cash out 
the kinds of harms to which the vulnerable are susceptible when their basic needs 
go unmet. But what they share is a view according to which our duty to the 
vulnerable is generated by the imperative of preventing the relevant harm from 
befalling them, and that its content thereby consists in meeting their basic needs.  
This approach is problematic, we aim to demonstrate, on two grounds. The 
first, which will be the subject of part two of this paper, is that vulnerability becomes 
a mere middle-man, philosophically speaking; in the final analysis, the justificatory 
work it does is of a wholly rhetorical variety.  According to vulnerability theory, a 
deficit of basic needs leaves one vulnerable to some kind of specific harm, and we 
must meet basic needs in order to prevent this harm. Vulnerability itself does not 
therefore seem to do any normative work in vulnerability theory: basic needs, and 
the harms to which a deficit therein gives rise, appear to do all the heavy lifting. 
What we will show in part two is thus that vulnerability theory accomplishes its 
justificatory goal without any normative appeal to vulnerability whatsoever.  
 3 
The second problem we identify with vulnerability theory, and to which we 
turn in part three of this paper, pertains specifically to the content that vulnerability 
theory yields for our collective obligations of social justice. Whether vulnerability 
per se is ultimately a foundational concept or, as we argue, a mere middle-man, the 
account it yields of social welfare institutions, and public health care provision in 
particular, is inadequate.  Vulnerability theory holds that our collective obligations 
are limited to preventing certain kinds of harm by meeting basic needs, and this 
implies a tightly circumscribed role for social welfare institutions, including the 
health care system.  In particular, vulnerability theory fails to account for three 
significant and appealing features of the health care systems we see throughout the 
developed world:  their universality, comprehensiveness, and mandatoriness.   As 
such, we contend in part three that not only the foundation, but the content of the 
obligation generated by vulnerability theory is not up to its institutional task.    
Our ultimate aim is to question the ability of vulnerability theory to ground 
our duties of justice, specifically as they pertain to health.  And our conclusion is that 
it is only able to ground duties of justice by reliance on the concept of basic needs, 
and as a result not only renders vulnerability itself normatively superfluous but also 
fails to provide grounds for the central features of a just health care system. We do 
not deny the value of vulnerability theory in accounting for our duties of virtue to 
provide care for those who depend on us, or to not exploit those with whom we 
stand in asymmetrical relationships.  It is with respect to grounding the institutions 
of the welfare state – and specifically those pertinent to satisfying health needs  - 
that we find vulnerability theory to be lacking. And that is what we will show here.   
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Part 1: Vulnerability Theory and Necessary Goods 
 It is incumbent upon vulnerability theorists to answer certain key questions, 
namely, what is it that makes us vulnerable (and why does this matter), and what 
obligations are thereby imposed (and upon whom)?1 There are a number of 
different answers vulnerability theorists have supplied to these questions, and thus 
a variety of vulnerability theories. As to what makes us vulnerable, ontological 
vulnerability theory identifies the sheer fact of our embodiment as the source 
thereof.2 On this approach, the extent to which we are vulnerable, or more 
vulnerable than others, will depend on physical characteristics and natural 
endowments, such as gender, age, physical ability and the like. Ontological 
vulnerability is occurrent, or something we all experience to some extent at various 
points in our life, albeit some more than others, or for longer periods of time, or in 
more pronounced ways. While this type of approach has a straightforward answer to 
the question of what makes us vulnerable, it struggles to ground any correlative 
duties.  Because ontological vulnerability is no one’s fault, it isn’t clear who bears a 
responsibility to lessen it, and because it is an inescapable fact of the human 
experience it is equally unclear (since ought implies can) that we can coherently 
have a duty to do so.3   
                                                 
1 Catriona Mackenzie, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds, “Introduction: What is Vulnerability, and 
Why Does it Matter for Moral Theory,” in Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, 
eds. Mackenzie, Rogers and Dodds (New York: Oxford, 2014): 1-29, at 4-5. 
2 Martha Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition,” Yale  
Journal of Law and Feminism, 20, 1 (2008). Judith Butler. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and 
Violence (London: Verson, 2009).  
3 Fineman argues we can in fact derive considerable implications of social justice from the  
fact of human embodiment and its associated vulnerabilities. See “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring  
Equality in the Human Condition.” If our treatment here of ontological views therefore strikes  
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Relational theory, on the other hand, contends that the source of our 
vulnerability lies in our dependence on specific others. That is, in order to be 
vulnerable in a normatively relevant sense, it must be the case that one is vulnerable 
to the actions and choices of others who are capable of affecting one ’s interests in 
concrete ways. As Mackenzie et al., put it ‘Whereas the ontological response to the 
question “What is Vulnerability?” stresses our common embodied humanity and 
equal susceptibility to suffering, this second response stresses the ways that 
inequalities of power, dependency, capacity, or need render some agents vulnerable 
to harm or exploitation by others.’4   
As for the obligations engendered by vulnerability, relational theorists have 
offered answers interpersonal or institutional in nature. On the first account, our 
duties to the vulnerable are to care for specific others with whom we stand in 
asymmetrical relations of power.   On the second account our duties are to erect and 
maintain social institutions that do not arbitrarily deprive, exploit or discriminate.  
Whether a relational theory emphasizes our interpersonal or institutional duties 
tends to relate back to how its proponent understands the source of our 
vulnerability. According to interpersonal vulnerability theory, since the source of an 
agent’s vulnerability is her relational dependence on a specific other with whom she 
stands in an asymmetrical power relationship, that concrete other has a duty to care 
for the vulnerable agent, and to protect her interests.  According to institutional 
                                                 
readers as too brief, or our dismissal too curt, our twofold critique of vulnerability theory in the 
pages to come can be thought to apply equally to institutional views grounded in ontology and 
relationality alike.  
4 Mackenzie et al., “Introduction: What is Vulnerability, and Why Does it Matter for Moral Theory,” 6 
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vulnerability theory, because the source of an agent’s vulnerability derives from an 
exploitative, exclusionary, and/or discriminatory institutional order, an obligation 
falls upon those who participate in those institutions to erect and maintain a just 
alternative order.  
It is these latter accounts of vulnerability theory we are primarily interested 
in here. What we refer to as institutional vulnerability theory  is undeniably 
relational but identifies particular social arrangements as the source of vulnerability, 
and as such cashes out our duties to the vulnerable in social justice terms. On the 
institutional view it is a concern with the kind of social scaffolding we build and 
support that provides the answer to why vulnerability matters normatively 
speaking, and why it imposes correlative duties of justice.  We are interested in these 
kinds of arguments precisely because they make vulnerability theory relevant to 
political philosophy, as a potential justificatory source for the primary institutions of 
the welfare state.    
To further illuminate the distinction between interpersonal and institutional 
relational accounts, consider the origins of vulnerability theory. The work of care 
ethicists and feminist ethicists was central in bringing vulnerability to the 
foreground of moral philosophy, by drawing attention to the imperative created by 
the concrete and particular needs of those most dependent on us.5 For care ethicists, 
our duty is to respond caringly to those whose interests are most vulnerable to our 
                                                 
5 Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley, University of 
California Press, 1994). Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s 
Development (Cambridge: Harvard, 1982). Joan Tronto. Moral Boundaries: A Political Argument for an 
Ethic of Care. New York, NY: Routledge, 1994; Eva Kittay, “Love’s Labour: Essays on Women, Equality, 
and Dependency (New York: Routledge, 1999). 
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particular actions and choices. Many care ethicists are drawn to the view because of 
the challenge it poses to universalist moral doctrines that celebrate impartiality 
whilst ignoring the concrete duties we have to those most dependent upon us. The 
Kantian view has taken the brunt of this critique. But as Sarah Clark Miller has 
recently argued, what is at stake when we are vulnerable is our dignity as agents; 
she thus motivates our duty to care for the vulnerable by drawing a link between 
care ethics and the very moral view it originated to challenge.6  
Care ethicists also regard their view as posing a serious challenge to 
traditional thinking about social and distributive justice, and particularly 
contractualist bargaining models thereof according to which social entitlements 
depend on one’s ability to negotiate.7 In their commitment to maintaining this 
critique, however, care ethicists have shied away from explaining or addressing 
institutional vulnerability as a problem of social and distributive justice. As Miller 
acknowledges, care based approaches stand accused of paying too little heed to the 
extent to which vulnerabilities are created through broader social systems, 
institutions, and patterns of oppression, and fail to appreciate that individual 
responses, no matter how well intentioned or executed, cannot solve the underlying 
causes thereof.8  
                                                 
6 Sarah Clark Miller, The Ethics of Need: Agency, Dignity, and Obligation  (New York: Routledge 2014). 
7 Michael Slote, “The Justice of Caring” In Virtues and Vices, eds. Paul, Miller, and Paul (New 
York:  Cambridge University Press. 1998). And Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability,  
Nationality, Species Membership (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
8 Miller, The Ethics of Need, 139. For Miller this critique derives from the claim, essential to care 
ethics, that we have moral reason to show partiality to those dependent on us specifically. But she 
also argues that while this means care ethicists must be innovative in their thinking about structural 
issues of both domestic and global justice, they need not and ought not remain silent on these issues. 
Virginia Held offers the most well-developed version of care ethics as a theory of global justice. See 
Held’s Ethics of Care: Personal, Political, Global (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  But the 
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While care ethics certainly inspired, and provided many of the conceptual 
tools employed by those who have since taken a more institutional approach, the 
view itself remains decidedly and determinedly interpersonal. It was arguably by 
way of response to the failure of the view to provide institutional analyses and 
solutions that the institutional model arose. It is should be noted, however, that for 
the majority of vulnerability theorists who we regard as taking the institutional 
approach, both personal and collective duties are warranted by the accounts they 
offer. That is, those who are concerned to motivate institutional duties of justice tend 
nonetheless to be concerned with motivating interpersonal duties of virtue as well, 
even if the reverse is not the case. We will nonetheless focus explicitly on the duties 
of justice generated by theorists we see as taking an institutional approach, given 
that our interest is to determine how (and how successfully) these views justify 
social welfare programs, and specifically public health care.  
The obligations imposed by vulnerability, according to those who take the 
institutional approach, are precisely to render just our social institutions. But how 
do they propose we do so? What must we do to address vulnerability? Institutional 
accounts have in common a recognition that our duties to the vulnerable entail the 
provision of certain essential goods. On this view, it is an institutionalized 
deprivation in their basics needs that render them vulnerable and our duty is to 
erect and maintain institutions that meet their needs. But which of their needs? And 
                                                 
tension between the partiality demanded by care ethics and the impartiality required for global 
justice remains unresolved, in our view, precisely because in extrapolating  care and vulnerability to 
the realm of justice it either loses its novelty or its normative force, as we go on to show.  
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why do their needs inspire obligations at all? And what does a deficit in basic needs 
render them vulnerable to? A word on basic needs theory, then.  
 In his highly influential foray into the matter, Harry Frankfurt argues that in 
unpacking the concept of ‘needs’ we must acknowledge their sheer intuitive force:  
“Claims based upon what a person needs frequently have a distinct poignancy. They 
are likely to arouse a more compelling sense of obligation, and to be treated with 
greater urgency, than claims based merely upon what someone wants.”9 Frankfurt 
continues, however, that not all need-claims inspire the same kind of urgency and 
thereby the same kind of obligation. For him “the moral importance of meeting or of 
not meeting a need must therefore be wholly derivative from the importance of the 
end that gives rise to it.”10 When something is a matter of need, Frankfurt argues, it 
must always be possible to specify what it is needed for. All necessities, he claims, 
are in this sense conditional; nothing is needed except in virtue of being an 
indispensable condition for the attainment of a specific end.  
For Frankfurt, it is the linkage to harm that differentiates needs that are 
morally interesting from those that are not. A person’s need has moral interest only 
if it will be a consequence of his failure to meet the need that he thereby incurs or 
continues to suffer some harm.11 Frankfurt is therefore arguing that we can 
distinguish needs from wants, and basic needs from non-basic ones, by applying a 
certain relational formula: X needs Y in order to Z. When something is needed it 
                                                 
9  Harry G. Frankfurt, “Necessity and Desire,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 45.1 
(1984): 1-14, at 1. 
10 Frankfurt, “Necessity and Desire,” p. 2. 
11 Frankfurt, “Necessity and Desire,” p. 4. 
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must always be possible to specify what that thing is needed for. And in order for a 
need to be morally relevant and inspire correlative and coercible obligations (such 
that the need must be met even if doing so would frustrate another ’s desires) it must 
be the case that the need in question has as its end the avoidance of harm.  
Frankfurt’s approach to thinking about needs and their normative force is 
echoed by countless needs theorists. David Copp claims that, “there seems to be a 
conceptual connection between the basic needs and the avoidance of harm; if a thing 
is a matter of basic need for a person, then the idea is that the person requires it in 
some quantity and in some form in order to avoid harm.”12 Garrett Thompson 
concurs: “the central pillar of an analysis of the concept ‘fundamental need’ must be 
a characterization of its antecedent, i.e., what the object of a fundamental need is 
necessary for - the avoidance of…harm.” 13 Copp continues, however, that if “Matters 
of basic need are things anyone would require in some quantity and in some form in 
order to avoid a blighted or harmed life….We require an account of what is meant by 
a blighted or harmed life in order to unify, and provide a theoretical justification for 
[an account] of basic needs.”14  
What qualifies as a need therefore depends on the nature of the harm it 
prevents or alleviates. And for the majority of needs theorists, as with relational 
vulnerability theorists, the harm in question pertains not just to our lives as 
embodied beings but to our lives as social and cooperative beings. The relevant 
                                                 
12 David Copp, “Equality, Justice, and the Basic Needs,” Necessary Goods, ed. Gillian Brock, (Lanham: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1998)” 113-134, at 124. 
13  Garrett Thompson, Needs (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1987), 36.  
14 Copp, “Equality, Justice, and the Basic Needs,” 124. 
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needs will thus include not just the stuff of life, as it were, but goods directed to 
promoting certain essential aspects of our lives as social beings.  Some needs 
theorists therefore prefer the term necessary goods to the term basic needs, 
precisely so as to differentiate that which we require to avoid merely physical, or 
ontological harm, from that which we require to avoid moral or social harm.15  
That institutional vulnerability theorists appeal to needs - or necessary goods 
- to cash out both the foundations and the content of our obligations to the 
vulnerable does not save them from the task of identifying the harm to which a 
needs deprivation gives rise. We turn now to evaluating the various accounts of 
harm that institutional vulnerability theorists have offered, and to demonstrating a 
consistent and problematic pattern of argumentation that calls into serious question 
the justificatory value of their approach to grounding our duties of justice. More 
specifically we will argue that in relying on the concept of basic needs, and the harm 
to which we are rendered susceptible by a deprivation therein, institutional 
vulnerability theory renders the concept of vulnerability itself normatively moot.  
 
Part 2: Vulnerability Theory and Harm  
Vulnerability theorists might assert that the harm we seek to avoid when we 
meet others’ needs is vulnerability itself. But this would make for poor 
argumentation, as all we have to ask is ‘vulnerability to what’ to put the normative 
burden back on their shoulders. Vulnerability describes the state of being susceptible 
                                                 
15 Gillian Brock, “Introduction” to Necessary Goods: Our Responsibilities to Meet Others’ Needs, ed. 
Gillian Brock (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,  1998): 1-18. 
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to harm, it does not constitute the harm itself. We are not harmed simply in virtue of 
being vulnerable; we are at risk of harm. The disvalue of being vulnerable thus 
derives from the disvalue of the harm to which we are susceptible. Some account 
must therefore be supplied as to the nature of the harm to which we are rendered 
susceptible to when our basic needs go unmet.  
Different vulnerability theorists cash out the nature of this harm in diverse ways, 
just as needs theorists themselves do. Some explain it in terms of exploitation, still 
others in terms of impaired agency, and others still in terms of an inability of the 
vulnerable to flourish.  We will look now at each of these views in turn. In the 
process we will identify and demonstrate a consistent pattern of argumentation that 
we take to be definitive of institutional vulnerability theory. The pattern is this:  
1. Some members of our society are more vulnerable than others to harm 
X because their basic needs are going unmet;  
2. Our duty to the vulnerable is generated by the imperative of preventing 
harm X; 
3. Our duty to the vulnerable consists in the requirement that we erect 
and maintain institutions that meet basic needs.  
 
We will argue that  although different theorists supply different values for X, it is 
nonetheless the type of harm they respectively identify that does the normative 
work their view requires; vulnerability simply comes to describe the state of our 
susceptibility, but it is the harm itself that obliges others to act.   
 
A. Exploitation  
 According to Robert Goodin’s seminal account of vulnerability theory we 
suffer harm when we are rendered dependent, due to a deprivation in our basic 
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needs, on those who might exploit our vulnerabilities. Exploitation, on Goodin’s 
view, constitutes a violation of the moral norm to protect the vulnerable. This norm 
lays upon us a strong moral responsibility not to take unfair advantage of those who 
are particularly vulnerable to our actions and choices.16 It is because we are in a 
position to exploit them that we have a special moral obligation not to do so.17 
Goodin continues, pace care ethicists, that while the duty to protect the 
vulnerable may indeed justify the sorts of special obligations we have towards those 
close to us, it does not justify these obligations alone. Our duty to protect the 
vulnerable requires not only that we refrain from exploiting the vulnerabilities of 
those who depend on us, but also that we do everything we can to prevent the 
exploitation of the vulnerable in general. Goodin continues that it is those in dire 
need who are most vulnerable to exploitation. Their need renders them dependent 
on others, and thereby vulnerable to exploitation at the hands of those upon whom 
they depend. Since our duty to protect the vulnerable requires that we prevent 
exploitation, it thus requires that we meet their basic needs.18  
It is imperative, for Goodin, that we meet these obligations via the institutions of 
the welfare state and that we do so in-kind whenever possible. This is because our 
social institutions are non-discretionary in a way that personal and private 
associations are not. State agencies apply rules universally; the mere fact of a 
claimant’s need suffices to ensure satisfaction thereof where an institutional rule  
                                                 
16  Robert E. Goodin, Reasons for Welfare: The Political Theory of the Welfare State  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988), 149. 
17 Goodin, Reasons for Welfare, 125. 
18 Robert E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), 111. 
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exists to this effect. And our job is to institute such a rule, because if instead we leave 
the meeting of needs up to personal associates and private associations, claims may 
be denied arbitrarily and thus in such a way that renders the dependent even mo re 
vulnerable. 19 Needs claims must also be met in-kind and not in cash, argues Goodin, 
precisely because the relevant provisions aim to prevent exploitation, not to satisfy 
preferences or enhance market autonomy.20  
Goodin’s argument clearly exemplifies the pattern of institutional vulnerability 
theory. Some members of our society are rendered vulnerable to the harm of 
exploitation due to a deprivation in their basic needs, he argues. Our duty to the 
vulnerable thus consists in the requirement not only that we desist personally in 
exploiting the vulnerabilities of those dependent on us, but that we protect the 
vulnerable from this potential harm at the hands of others by erecting and 
maintaining non-discretionary institutions designed to meet their basic needs in-
kind.  
 
B. Autonomy  
On a second account of institutional vulnerability theory, it is an impairment 
of autonomy to which we are rendered vulnerable when our basic needs are unmet, 
and which thereby gives rise to correlative duties of justice. For theorists who take 
this route, the capacity to exercise some degree of self-determination is crucial for 
                                                 
19 Robert E. Goodin, “Vulnerabilities and Responsibilities: An Ethical Defense of the Welfare State,” in 
Necessary Goods, ed. Gillian Brock, (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998): 73-94, at 88. See also 
Reasons for Welfare, 15-17, 184-196. 
20  Goodin, Reasons for Welfare, 8. 
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leading a meaningful life, and vulnerability describes the state of being in a position 
whereby we can’t exercise this type of self-determination. As Catriona Mackenzie 
argues, we have a profound interest in making sure our society is one in which we 
are all able to lead a life that expresses our distinctly human capacities for choice 
and self-reflection, and in which we are able to exercise these capacities in line with 
our beliefs, values, wants, goals, and self-identity.21 Sarah Clark Miller puts the point 
in more Kantian terms when she argues that we cannot realize our properly human 
capacities when we suffer a deprivation in our fundamental needs, and that these 
needs are constituted precisely by that which dignified agents require by way of 
determining and seeking ends for themselves.22 
Importantly, for Mackenzie, as for many vulnerability theorists, agency is 
relational. In the hands of institutional vulnerability theorists this concept has been 
used to demonstrate not just how our decision-making can be supported by those 
with whom we stand in concrete and interdependent relationships but by the social 
institutions that at once both presuppose and promote autonomous decision-
making. Mackenzie takes the concept of agential relationality to mean that we make 
choices through deliberation with others, and that we need to feel included in 
discussions of this kind to regard our choices as worthwhile.23 Joel Anderson agrees 
that social recognition is essential to robust agency, and argues further that we are 
rendered vulnerable by what he calls imposed infeasibilities, or policies that impose 
                                                 
21 Catriona Mackenzie, “The Importance of Relational Autonomy and Capabilities for an Ethics of 
Vulnerability,” in Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy (London: Oxford, 2014): 
33-59, at 41. 
22 Miller, The Ethics of Need,  23-31.  
23  Catriona Mackenzie, “The Importance of Relational Autonomy and Capabilities for an Ethics of 
Vulnerability,” 44. 
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duties upon us while presupposing autonomy competencies we don’t possess. The 
extent to which we are autonomous depends, he argues, on what is institutionally 
expected of us, thereby making our agency socially dependent.24  
The upshot for institutional vulnerability theorists who see the relevant harm 
in terms of autonomy deprivation is that we must include among the basic needs 
required for a meaningful life the kinds of social supports and relational 
opportunities necessary for developing and exercising our autonomy. For Mackenzie, 
these cannot be ensured merely by taking special care of those close to us, precisely 
because constructing the type of social scaffolding necessary for social inclusion is 
inevitably a collective project. Anderson argues further that since our autonomy 
competencies must be bolstered to lessen our vulnerability to imposed 
infeasibilities, the relevant correlative duties must clearly fall on those who impose 
or benefit from the policies in question. Once again we see the pattern of 
institutional vulnerability theory: the harm to which the vulnerable are rendered 
susceptible due to a deprivation in necessary goods is impaired autonomy, and the 
promotion of autonomy requires that we erect and maintain institutions that 
guarantee these goods.  
 
C. Flourishing 
A third strategy cashes out the harm in question in terms of impaired 
flourishing. This strategy is one to which a great many needs theorists are 
                                                 
24 Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth, “Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice,” in Autonomy 
and the Challenges to Liberalism eds. John Christman and Joel Anderson (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 205): 127-149. See also: Joel Anderson, “Autonomy Gaps,” in this volume.  
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themselves partial. According to Garrett Thompson we are harmed when we are 
rendered unable to flourish due to a needs deprivation.25 The good that the 
satisfaction of our basic needs makes possible consists in our having the ability to 
engage in certain types of intrinsically valuable activities, and a deprivation in our 
basic needs is harmful precisely because it thwarts us in this regard. David 
Braybrooke gives further content to this concept. He argues that the specific kind of 
harm we suffer if our basic needs go unmet is that we are unable to carry out the 
tasks associated with the basic social roles of parent, householder, worker, and 
citizen. To flourish, or to function normally as a human being, on his view, is to 
perform the tasks associated with these basic social roles, or more precisely, to be 
able to perform these tasks without derangement.26 What he calls course-of-life 
needs are those needs essential to carrying out the four tasks essential for a 
flourishing human life. That our duty to meet these needs is a duty of justice, for 
Braybrooke is established on the straightforwardly consequential basis that more 
people will meet others needs when these duties are enforced.  27   
 Although neither a self-described vulnerability theorist nor basic needs 
theorist, Martha Nussbaum offers an account of our duties to the vulnerable that 
appeals precisely to the injustice of impaired flourishing imposed by institutional 
deprivations in certain necessary goods. On her account, to flourish as the kinds the 
beings we are, and thus to live the life of a dignified human agent,  we require the 
                                                 
25 Thompson, Needs, 39. 
26 David Braybrooke, Meeting Needs (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).  
27 David Braybrooke, “The Concept of Needs, with a Heartwarming Offer of Aid to Utilitarianism,” in 
Necessary Goods, ed. Gillian Brock, (Lanham: Rowman &Littlefield, 1998): 57-72. 
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capabilities relevant to self-determination, and to experiencing our embodiment 
without suffering or deprivation. The goods, or capabilities, necessary to alleviating 
vulnerability are those essential to the leading a distinctly human life of value, which 
involves having the freedom to function in various choice-worthy ways, including 
ways that celebrate and recognize our embodiment.28  
For Nussbaum, vulnerability arises when one’s achievement of meaningful 
human goals and the exercise of one’s distinctly human capacities is impaired due to 
an absence of the relevant capabilities for functioning, and thus for flourishing. That 
these impairments are experienced by some more than others is not the result of 
nature, or the mere fact of differential embodiment, but of an unjust global 
institutional order. Indeed vulnerability, understood as a deprivation in essential 
capabilities for functioning, serves as an indicator of injustice for Nussbaum.29 The 
relevant duty of justice is a duty to enable equal flourishing by working to guarantee 
the capabilities essential for valuable functionings wherever, and for whomever, we 
find them to be lacking. Once again the pattern of institutional vulnerability theory: 
the harm to which the vulnerable are rendered susceptible due to a deprivation in 
necessary goods, understood as central human capabilities, is impaired flourishing; 
our correlative duty is not simply to respond interpersonally in caring ways, but to 
erect and maintain institutions that guarantee the necessary goods.30 
                                                 
28 Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice, 278.  
29 Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
30Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011). 
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According to each of the three preceding versions of vulnerability theory, the 
vulnerabilities that gives rise to collective obligations are the result of particular 
social deprivations that put some in a more precarious position than others with 
respect to a particular harm. The purpose of this survey was to demonstrate a 
pattern, whereby the collective duty generated is one according to which we must 
meet needs to prevent the relevant harm, be it exploitation, or impairments in 
agency, or flourishing. We sought to demonstrate this pattern to show that 
vulnerability as a concept is not in fact doing the justificatory work of institutional 
vulnerability theory. Reconsider the pattern:  
 
1. Some members of our society are more vulnerable than others to harm 
X because their basic needs are going unmet;  
2. Our duty to the vulnerable is generated by the imperative of preventing 
harm X (exploitation, impaired agency, impaired flourishing); 
3. Our duty to the vulnerable consists in the requirement that we erect 
and maintain institutions that meet basic needs.  
 
It is not vulnerability as such that is normatively relevant here, it is the harm 
to which we are put at risk due to a deprivation in our basic needs. Without an 
appeal to one of the normatively weighty concepts that serve as a stand in for harm 
X, vulnerability theory cannot justify a duty to meet needs. It describes the state of 
being deprived and thereby at risk. What it provides, therefore, is a useful rhetorical 
device by which we might better identify the needy and discuss the goods required 
by those most at risk of relational harms. But it cannot normatively ground the 
relevant duty without appeal to basic needs and the end to which their satisfaction 
aims. Conceptually speaking, therefore, vulnerability looks like a mere middle-man, 
and vulnerability theory like basic needs theory with a different name.  
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Why is this problematic? Not just because it looks like philosophical smoke 
and mirrors, but because it is one of moral and political philosophy’s most 
significant tasks to differentiate between concepts that describe and concepts that 
oblige.  Terms like vulnerability (along with exploitation, commodification, and 
propaganda, to name a few) have an enormous amount of rhetorical force. They are 
used liberally to describe a wide array of actions and scenarios that happen to strike 
us as morally troubling. And their use alone is presumed to be adequate to explain 
and justify our moral condemnation, and even in some instances social regulation 
and criminal legislation.31 But it is precisely when handling concepts that carry such 
significant rhetorical force that philosophers themselves have be the most careful.  32  
The philosopher should instruct us with respect to their proper application and give 
us the tools with which to determine their frivolous or clumsy use. Consider, for 
example, Alan Wertheimer’s trenchant analysis of exploitation, and the distinctions 
                                                 
31  Consider legislation which criminalizes the sale of bodily goods and services on the grounds that 
they exploit women.  See for example Canada’s Assisted Human Reproduction Act (S.C 2004, c.2) 
which criminalizes paid surrogacy, or Canada’s Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons 
Act (S.C. 2014, c.25) which criminalizes prostitution under described circumstances. Both acts 
condemn the exploitation of women, but neither supplies an account as to why paid gestation or 
paid sexual encounters are inevitably exploitative. The rhetorical force of the term is left to do the 
moral persuasion and legal justification, and we are left with what are arguably unjust restrictions 
on women’s choices regarding both their bodies and their professions.  
32 Vulnerability, as a concept, has been made much of in bioethics. It has been called forth both to 
identify those most susceptible to poor health outcomes or to unjust exclusion from health care 
systems, and has also served as valuable tool by which to cash out the ethical duties of medical 
and clinical researchers to their test subjects, and of physicians and hospital administrators to 
their patients and clients (See Wendy Rogers, “Vulnerability and Bioethics,” in Vulnerability: New 
Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, eds Mackenzie, Rogers, and Dodds (London: Oxford, 
2014): 60-88). But the concept has also, and more troublingly, been used as a label to exclude 
certain groups, such as pregnant women, from participating in clinical research of potentially 
significant value both to themselves and other members of their social group. See Toby Schonfeld, 
“The Perils of Protection: Vulnerability and Women in Clinical Research,” Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics 34,3 (2013):189-206.  Vulnerability, therefore, like exploitation, is a double-edged 
sword: while the term’s rhetorical force might enable us to call for the protection of needy 
populations, its clumsy or unjustified use can come at significant cost to them.   
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he offered between cases in which we can identify exploitation but not condemn it, 
and still others in which we can condemn but not regulate.33  
What practical philosophy offers are the tools to think more carefully about 
morally laden concepts, and how and when they are rightly employed – or deployed. 
It is not that institutional vulnerability theory fails to do this entirely.  But while the 
concept’s use adds something interesting of both critical and descriptive value to 
our thinking about social and distributive justice, it does not thereby add anything of 
normative value. Our task in part one of this paper, then, has been to show that 
foundationally speaking, when it comes to grounding our duties of justice, 
institutional vulnerability theory doesn’t seem to get us anything we don’t already 
have.  We turn now in part three to articulating a second troubling aspect of 
institutional vulnerability theory, namely that in its appeal to basic needs it not only 
fails to offer novel foundations for our duties of justice, but also to provide adequate 
content to these duties.  
 
Part 3: Vulnerability Theory and Health Care 
Whether the concept of vulnerability proves to be normatively foundational 
or, as we argued in the previous section, a merely descriptive concept that alerts us 
to obligations grounded elsewhere, institutional vulnerability theory nonetheless 
offers a distinct account of our duties of justice, an account that many of its 
proponents see as a viable alternative to contractualist views. A closer look at the 
content of our duties of justice according to institutional vulnerability theory, 
                                                 
33 Alan Wertheimer, Exploitation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). 
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however, calls this ambition into question. We focus here on institutional 
vulnerability theory's implications for health care justice in particular, in part 
because we recognize the significance of vulnerability theory's many important 
contributions to micro-level bioethics in spelling out the duties of doctors to 
patients and researchers to subjects. These contributions are extremely valuable, 
and yet for vulnerability theory to play a foundational role in bioethics, it ought to be 
able to say something about macro-allocations as well; it ought to be able to provide 
a justification for the provision of health care in general.  
To provide an adequate justification for a robust health care system, it is not 
enough to articulate a set of reasons why it is morally desirable that we meet 
citizens' health needs. Any moral theory worthy of the name can say something in 
favour of the proposition that, all else equal, it is a good thing when people are able 
to access needed medical care. Importantly, though, the specific reasons proffered 
for meeting people's health needs will also determine the shape and scope of public 
health care institutions. This is where institutional vulnerability theory falls short. 
We argue that, inasmuch as institutional vulnerability theory holds that our 
obligations of justice are to prevent certain kinds of harm by meeting citizens' basic 
needs, the theory yields a surprisingly limited set of duties of justice, and these 
limited duties prove particularly insufficient to justify an adequate health care 
system. This finding may be unexpected to those who imagine vulnerability theory 
as a more demanding account of social justice than rival bargaining models.  
In particular, we will argue that institutional vulnerability theory cannot 
justify health coverage that has three important features. First, institutional 
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vulnerability theory cannot justify the universal provision of health care or health 
care insurance. Wealthy liberal democracies extend health care coverage to all 
citizens, not just a select few. Second, institutional vulnerability theory cannot justify 
health care coverage that is comprehensive. Public health care or health care 
insurance systems tend to cover all of an ordinary person's health care needs, rather 
than a bare minimum.  Third and finally, it cannot justify the mandatory provision of 
health care coverage. Citizens in liberal democracies may not opt out of their health 
care benefits in exchange for their present cash value, regardless of how much they 
might prefer it or how much more they might need something else entirely.  
We argue that, as a theory of health care justice, institutional vulnerability 
theory is unable to justify a health care system with all of these features. In the rest 
of this section, we take up each in turn and show that institutional vulnerability 
theory is unable to account for it. Of course, not all forms of institutional 
vulnerability theory discussed in the previous section struggle with each to the same 
degree, as we will see, but none can explain them all, and thus none can properly 
account for the health care systems we know and value.  
This is problematic for at least two reasons. First and most obviously, we take 
it that these three features—universality, comprehensiveness, and mandatoriness—
have obvious intuitive appeal. Indeed, they form the core of our  shared 
understanding of what a just health care system should look like, and a theory that 
cannot account for them is to that extent normatively deficient. Second, these 
features are already firmly entrenched in the health care systems of existing liberal  
democracies. To the extent that institutional vulnerabilty theory aspires to provide a 
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theory of the welfare state, it ought to be able to ground these features. We do not 
mean to suggest that normative political philosophy must be hostage to the real; as  
vulnerability theorists know all too well, existing health care systems are often 
plagued with inequities and inefficiencies, and in the face of these, political 
philosophy should be able to provide space for critique and guidance for reform. But 
we take it that these three important features of existing health care systems are, as 
it were, “fixed points” which a theory must accommodate.34   
 
A. Universality 
 The health care systems that we see throughout the developed world are 
typically universal in scope, and a theory of health care justice ought to be able to 
justify this. Making the political case for universal health care has everywhere meant 
advocating for the extension of health care access down the income scale, toward the 
most vulnerable members of our society. Indeed, this remains a matter of pressing 
moral concern today, even in the developed world. And yet if we are looking for a 
theory of health care justice that justifies universal access, we must be careful not to 
focus too much on the case for helping the disadvantaged, lest we lose sight of the 
rationale for covering the well-to-do and the middle class as well.  
 This is precisely where institutional vulnerability theory runs into trouble. As 
we saw in the previous section, institutional vulnerability theory holds that, because 
some members of our society face basic needs deficits which leave them vulnerable 
                                                 
34 For an interesting discussion of some of these issues, see Joseph Heath, “Three Normative Models 
of the Welfare State,” Public Reason 3.2 (2011): 13-43, at 13-15. 
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to specific harms, such as exploitation or loss of autonomy, we therefore have a 
collective obligation to protect those individuals from those specific harms by 
erecting and maintaining institutions to meet their basic needs. Rich and middle -
class persons do not face basic needs deficits, and thus they are not vulnerable to the 
specific harms that follow from them. According to institutional vulnerability theory, 
therefore, our obligations to meet basic needs simply do not extend to them.   
 It does not help to point to the fact that all citizens, even rich ones, have basic 
needs. According to institutional vulnerability theory, it is not the mere fact that 
people have basic needs that generates collective obligations to erect institutions to 
meet those needs. What triggers collective obligations is rather the prospect of a 
basic needs deficit, which leaves an individual vulnerable to a specific kind of harm. 
All citizens have basic needs, but only some have needs that are going unmet . Thus 
even though all citizens have nutritional needs, for example, institutional 
vulnerability theory does not imply that nutritional assistance programs should  be 
universal in scope. These programs are properly restricted to the truly 
disadvantaged, those who may come to harm because of a lack of nutrition. In 
principle, the same considerations should apply to health care.35 
 The scope of health care provision is narrowest on a view like Goodin's, on 
which the purpose of welfare state institutions is to prevent relationships of 
                                                 
35 For the reasons glossed in this paragraph, a pure basic needs view might fare better than a 
vulnerability-based view at justifying universal health care. On the other hand, if the mere fact of 
having basic needs (as opposed to having an actual or potential deficit of basic needs) triggers a 
collective obligation to meet those needs, then basic needs theory would appear to mandate not 
only universal health care but also universal programs providing food, water, housing, clothing, 
and so on. We would regard this as an embarrassing implication of the theory, but some might see 
it otherwise. 
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dependency from becoming exploitable. If it is only the dependent who require 
collective protection, then it seems like we only have a justification for providing 
health care to them.36 But even on a view that understands vulnerability in terms of 
potential harms to autonomy or to flourishing, there is simply no case for covering 
the truly well-off. Again, the reason is simply that the well-off have ample means to 
purchase their own health care; they are not at all vulnerable to a basic needs deficit, 
and so a fortiori they are not vulnerable to any further harms that such a deficit 
might cause.  
 To be clear, we are not suggesting that there is any serious danger that the 
rich might be shut out of access to health care institutions. Nor do we mean to posit 
some kind of false moral equivalency between advocating for the interests of the 
vulnerable and advocating for those of the well-to-do. But advocacy is one thing and 
theory is another, and if we are looking for a theory of health care justice that fits 
existing health care institutions, it ought to justify the provision of health care for 
rich and poor alike. Institutional vulnerability theory cannot justify the universal 
provision of health care.37 If vulnerability theory were the correct theory of health 
                                                 
36 For what it's worth, Goodin himself acknowledges this implication of his view; he does not intend 
his theory to extend to universal programs like health care. Goodin, Reasons for Welfare, 5-7, 368-
369. 
37 It might be suggested that the problems glossed in this section could be circumvented by shifting 
from an institutional to an ontological understanding of vulnerability. Institutional vulnerability 
theory's problems in justifying universal access to health care stem from its focus on the 
particularly vulnerable, so an account of vulnerability that focuses on the ways in which we are all 
vulnerable might fare better. Martha Fineman's account, for example, focuses on the ways that 
institutions can promote resilience in the face of universal vulnerability. 
 The most important thing to notice about Fineman's view is that, insofar as she circumvents the 
problems that institutional vulnerability theory faces in justifying universal access, she does so by 
appeal to an independent norm of equality. Fineman argues that there is something valuable in 
ensuring that access to social institutions that promote resilience is equally distributed. Absent 
this appeal to equality, she would have no answer to the question of why access has to be 
universal and comprehensive. It may be that we are universally vulnerable to ill health, but only 
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care justice, we should expect to see public health care only for the poor and 
vulnerable, leaving rich and middle-class persons to obtain their health care on the 
market, from their own resources.38 But this is not what we see, nor (we would 
suggest) is it something we should want.  
B. Comprehensiveness 
 Another important feature of public health care systems in the developed 
world is their comprehensiveness. Political philosophers and bioethicists often talk 
about the moral imperative of guaranteeing everyone at least a “decent minimum” of 
health care, but in fact rich-world health care systems typically provide for all of the 
health care needs of an ordinary person. This is not what we should expect if the 
purpose of our public health care institutions were merely to meet the basic needs 
of vulnerable people in order to prevent certain specific types of harm. Indeed, 
depending on the nature of the harm we are obliged to prevent, institutional 
vulnerability theory predicts a very stingy level of health care provision indeed. Just 
how stingy, though, will depend upon the harm we have to prevent. 
 An autonomy-based account of vulnerability would have trouble justifying 
any important health care services that do not protect or restore patients' autonomy. 
Consider, for example, the case of palliative care and other end-of-life services. By 
one oft-cited estimate, some 30% of health care expenditure in the United States 
                                                 
some of us are vulnerable to going without health care. See Martha Fineman, “The Vulnerable 
Subject and the Responsive State, Emory Law Journal 60.2 (2010): 251-275. 
38 Of course, in certain places it might prove pragmatically necessary to extend health benefits 
beyond the truly disadvantaged in order to secure political support for covering for the truly 
vulnerable. We do not doubt that as a matter of coalition-building such trade-offs may be 
necessary, but this would provide only a contingent and indeed tenuous reason for covering the 
non-vulnerable. It would not be a principled reason, and it would certainly not show that the well -
off were entitled to such benefits as a matter of right. cf. Goodin, Reasons for Welfare, 19. 
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goes toward patients in the last six months of life.39 We grant that we do not always 
know until after the fact when a patient has entered the last six months of her life, 
and some care delivered in that interval is genuinely intended to restore a patient to 
autonomous functioning. But often it is known that death is imminent, and care is 
administered merely for the sake of relieving pain or postponing the inevitable.40 On 
an autonomy-based view of health care, such care would be completely unjustified.  
 Indeed, the problem is even worse, for depending on how autonomy is 
construed, an autonomy-based view could have trouble justifying almost any kind of 
care that does not directly protect our cognitive capacities for reflection and choice.  
A person is not necessarily less autonomous just because there are some things she 
cannot physically do; we are not less autonomous for being unable to sprint like an 
Olympic athlete, and in principle the same point applies to someone who is unable 
to do any number of other things due to disease or disability. No doubt we have a 
collective obligation to treat these impairments (and/or to provide functional 
replacements where needed), but we question whether such care can truly be 
described as protecting patients' autonomy. 
 A view grounded in flourishing can avoid some of these problems. At least, 
such a view would find it easier to explain why we treat “merely” physical diseases 
and disabilities in addition to those diseases that merely affect people's cap acities 
for autonomous choice. Even if we are not less autonomous for being unable to 
engage in certain characteristic human activities, these impairments do affect our 
                                                 
39 Jonathan Gruber, Public Finance and Public Policy (New York: Worth, 2005), 443. 
40 Shlomi Segall, “Is Health Care (Still) Special?,” Journal of Political Philosophy 15.3 (2007): 342-361 
at 347-8. 
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ability to flourish. But a flourishing view will have the same difficulties as an 
autonomy view with justifying palliative and end-of-life care, since such persons 
have passed the point at which they can lead a flourishing life.  
 A flourishing view will suffer further defects as well. Consider Braybrooke’s 
claim that our obligation is to satisfy the course-of-life-needs of parents, workers, 
homeowners, and citizens.41 What of the health needs of those individuals who are 
unable (or unwilling) to participate in some combination of those social roles? 
Treatment of these needs would not appear to protect their flourishing in those 
roles, and so would appear to fall outside the scope of justice, at least according to 
institutional vulnerability theory. And if that worry speaks more to the problem of 
universality than comprehensiveness, then we reiterate our concern that this type of 
view seems unable to justify meeting the end of life health needs of those who once 
occupied these roles but who will never do so again.  
 A theory of health care justice grounded in the importance of protecting 
patients from certain very specific harms should in principle justify only such care 
as actually prevents the relevant harms. And yet what we see in the real world are 
health care systems that are, with some exceptions, quite comprehensive in scope. It 
is true that services like dentistry, optometry, and fertility are often excluded from 
public health care systems, and we would join those who advocate for expanding 
access to these services; but this would only appear to move the justificatory bar 
further from the reach of institutional vulnerability theory. By and large citizens of 
                                                 
41 Braybrooke, “The Concept of Needs, with a Heartwarming Offer of Aid to Utilitarianism,” 60-61. 
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wealthy countries expect and receive far more than the “bare essentials” when it 
comes to health care, and rightly so.   
 Before closing this section, however, it is worth pointing out that while on the 
one hand autonomy and flourishing-based views appear to justify too little by way of 
health care provision, particularly with respect to end of life care, in another 
important respect they threaten to justify too much. Existing health care systems are 
comprehensive, but only with respect to services properly regarded as treatments, 
not enhancements. Treatments are geared toward preventing departures from, or 
restoring a patient to, their normal range of functioning, while enhancements seek 
to expand an otherwise normal range of functioning. 
That our health care systems are characterized by their comprehensive with 
respect to treatment but not enhancement, is captured by the mandate that covered 
services be ‘medically necessary,’ that is, reasonable and effective for the treatment 
or prevention of disease and disability.  On autonomy-based and flourishing-based 
accounts of institutional vulnerability theory, however, the mandate is to meet needs 
defined as those things we require to avoid harms to our agency or our capacity to 
flourish. It is easy to see that autonomy needs or flourishing needs need not map 
neatly onto the concept of medical need. Arguably there are a great many cognitive 
and physical enhancements that could improve our capacity for rational reflection 
or expand our potential range of meaningful activities, and thereby enable us to 
avoid the harm of limits to agency or constraints on available avenues to a 
meaningful life. If, therefore, we understand health care provision as intended to 
provide those goods required to avoid harms to agency or flourishing rather than to 
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treat disease and disability per se, we may lose sight of any rationale for providing 
services on the basis of medical necessity, and we may have to abandon the 
treatment-enhancement distinction altogether. Thus while for the most part we 
worry that these views justify too limited a package of covered services, we note that 
they also have the potential to overshoot the target and get us too much in some 
ways, even as they deliver too little in others.  
C. Mandatoriness 
 The flip side of the fact that health care systems in the developed world are 
universal is that they are also typically mandatory. We do not mean that health care 
is mandatory in the sense that sick persons are forced to submit to treatment 
against their will. Rather, we mean that citizens of wealthy liberal democracies are 
not usually allowed to opt out of their health care coverage and take an equivalent 
cash benefit or tax credit instead, and this is so regardless of how much they might 
prefer the latter (or indeed how much more they might need it).  
 It might be thought that vulnerability theory can readily explain this 
particular feature of health care delivery. There is a widespread intuition in moral 
philosophy that meeting basic needs is somehow more important or more urgent, 
morally speaking, than merely satisfying people's preferences. Many people think 
that this greater urgency justifies providing certain forms of social assistance in -
kind only. T.M. Scanlon captures the intuition aptly: “The fact that someone would be 
willing to forgo a decent diet in order to build a monument to his god does not mean 
that his claim on others for aid in his project has the same strength as a claim for aid 
in obtaining enough to eat (even assuming that the sacrifices required of others 
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would be the same).”42 Goodin seems to appeal to something like this intuition when 
he suggests that welfare state benefits are appropriately provided in-kind rather 
than in cash; on Goodin's view, this is because the aim of these benefits is not to 
promote citizens' autonomy or to satisfy their preferences but to prevent 
exploitation, and this aim is accomplished by making sure citizens basic needs are 
met.43 The underlying idea must be that preventing exploitation by meeting basic 
needs is a more serious or urgent task than simply helping citizens get what they 
want. 
 The problem with this line of reasoning is that it does not necessarily support 
mandatory provision. It may well be true that a person has a stronger claim for aid 
in satisfying her basic needs than she has for aid in fulfilling her other projects, but 
that is a claim about the relative urgency of various ends; it does not necessarily 
entail anything about the best means for realizing those ends. The greater urgency of 
satisfying basic needs does not yield a presumption in favor of mandatory, in -kind 
provision unless there is good reason to think that mandatory provision is a more 
effective means to that end than the available alternatives, such as cash transfers. It 
is difficult to imagine why this must be the case, unless we are prepared to assume 
that vulnerable people are not actually willing or able to use their money to obtain 
the things that they need. This assumption is dubious, resting as it does on a rather 
dim view of the rationality of vulnerable people. We are generally suspicious of 
                                                 
42 T.M. Scanlon, “Preference and Urgency,” Journal of Philosophy 72.19 (1975): 655-669, at 659-60. 
43 Goodin, Reasons for Welfare, 11. 
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arguments that smack of paternalism, particularly when such paternalism is 
directed towards the vulnerable.44 
 Giving people money is usually not an alternative to meeting their basic 
needs, but an alternative way of meeting their basic needs. And may prove to be a 
better way, at that. Here it is important to keep in mind that vulnerable people are 
often vulnerable along more than just one dimension. Thus while forcing vulnerable 
people to devote a certain portion of their public benefits to health needs can be an 
effective way of making sure their health needs are met, it is often an equally 
effective way of making sure that some of their other needs go unmet. Goods 
provided in-kind can meet one kind of need only, but families can direct their cash 
benefits wherever they are needed most, whether that is health care, nutrition, 
housing, or what have you.45 In this respect, cash benefits would be better able to 
protect the vulnerable and thereby to satisfy the requirements of institutional 
vulnerability theory.  
 The difficulty of justifying the mandatory provision of health care on 
autonomy-based views is particularly acute. These views would appear to generate a 
strong presumption in favor of cash benefits, allowing individuals to choose for 
                                                 
44 Mackenzie, “The Importance of Relational Autonomy and Capabilities for an Ethics of 
Vulnerability,” 46-47 
45 It may be objected here that vulnerable persons should not have to choose between paying for 
medical care and paying for other basic needs. We would agree. But while the mandatory 
provision of health care does indeed preclude this choice, it does so without necessarily doing 
anything to ensure that people's other basic needs are met. In light of this, one might suggest 
retaining mandatory provision of health care and adding additional social programs to ensure all 
other basic needs are met in-kind. But an equally promising solution might be to dispense with 
mandatory provision altogether in favor of a more generous cash transfer.  Our point is only that 
the choice between these policies ought to be made on the basis of which most effectively protects 
the vulnerable.  
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themselves how best to deploy their share of social resources. Of course, there is 
always a tension between protecting people's capacities for autonomous choice and 
respecting particular exercises of those capacities, particularly because people will 
sometimes make choices that tend to undermine their choosing capacities. This 
tension may seem to speak in favor of paternalistic measures like the mandatory 
provision of health care, but in a thoroughly equivocal way; overriding someone's 
autonomous choice in the name of protecting her autonomy is both conceptually and 
morally fraught territory. 
 Our aim in this section is not to reject the mandatory provision of health care 
benefits; we see this as an important feature of health care provision. Our aim has 
been to show that, for a view which treats social benefits like health care as 
instrumental to meeting basic needs, which in turn is treated as instr umental to 
protecting the vulnerable from certain specific harms, it is not clear that the 
mandatory provision of health care will prove the most effective means. Presumably 
the choice between a policy of mandatory health care provision and a policy which 
allows citizens to opt for a cash benefit instead should be made on the basis of which 
can be expected to best protect the vulnerable from the relevant harm to which they 
are susceptible. What we hope to have shown is that it is at least possible that cash 
benefits might do better, at least in certain circumstances, and thus a positive case 
for mandatory provision ought to be forthcoming.  Few vulnerability theorists have 
attempted to make that case, perhaps because they have assumed that establishing 
an obligation to meet people's basic needs entails an obligation to meet them 
directly and in-kind.  On our view, no such conclusion necessarily follows. 
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 We have argued that institutional vulnerability theory is ill-suited to justify 
three of the most intuitively appealing and ubiquitous features of health care 
systems throughout the developed world: their universality, their 
comprehensiveness, and their mandatoriness. To justify these features, it is 
necessary to appeal to the benefits of health care to all, not just to those most 
vulnerable to certain kinds of harm. This is true even though helping the poor and 
vulnerable is a more urgent task, morally speaking, than ensuring that wealthy and 
middle-class persons can access care.  
 By way of concluding this section, it is worth pointing out that the three 
features of health care systems that we have isolated are significant not only for 
being intuitively powerful and entrenched in liberal-democratic practice; they also 
enjoy widespread support from other existing theories of health care justice. A 
number of theories of health care justice converge on the importance of a health 
care system with these features, including Norman Daniels' influential opportunity-
based account and Ronald Dworkin's theory of equality of resources.46 These views 
sometimes attract criticism for their individualistic foundations, but their robust 
egalitarianism yields attractive accounts of justice in health care, at least along the 
three dimensions that have been our focus here. While vulnerability theory may 
therefore provide a compelling critique of the foundations of contractualist views, 
                                                 
46 Norman Daniels, Just Health (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Ronald Dworkin, 
“Justice in the Distribution of Health Care,” McGill Law Journal 38.4 (1993): 883-898; Ronald 
Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2000). 
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our analysis here suggests that it looks less able to ground the central features of the 
welfare state, and certainly our duties of health justice.  
 
Conclusion: 
Our aim in this paper has been to question the ability of what we have called 
institutional vulnerability theory to ground our duties of justice, specifically as they 
pertain to health.  Our conclusion is largely a negative one. As we argued in part one, 
institutional vulnerability theorists are able to ground duties of justice only by 
relying on a pattern of argumentation that takes basic needs as central and thereby 
appeals to the normative importance of preventing the harms to which a deficit 
therein gives rise. The upshot of this argumentative pattern, we argued in part two, 
is that vulnerability itself is rendered normatively irrelevant to vulnerability theory. 
This should strike us as significant if we expect our moral and political doctrines to 
properly distinguish between concepts that describe and concepts that oblige.  
We went on to show in the second part of the paper that institutional 
vulnerability theory is not only unable to provide distinct grounds for our duties of 
justice in a theoretical sense, but also fails to ground the three central features of a 
just health care system. The view is ill-suited, we argued, to justifying, the fact that 
public health care systems tend to be universal, comprehensive, and mandatory. We 
close by avowing that we do not question the ability of relational vulnerability 
theory to account for our interpersonal duties of virtues. It is with respect to 
grounding the institutions of the welfare state – and specifically those pertinent to 
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meeting health needs  - that we found vulnerability theory to be lacking, and that is 
what we hope to have demonstrated here.  
 
